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LOCAL GOVERNMENT: OLD PROBLEMS AND
A NEW CONSTITUTION
by James D. Moore
INTRODUCTION
In 1970 it was noted that the Illinois Constitution of 1870, since
repealed, was laden with provisions pertaining to local government
which together read like a poorly drafted statute.' The Montana Con-
stitution, in its present form, would appear to epitomize any "poorly-
drafted-statute" classification. 2 It is unnecessarily steeped in detail,
3
highly restrictive, 4 and peppered with provisions which effect indirect
prohibitions on necessary change.
5
Perhaps no one has felt the stifling inflexibility of our 1889 Con-
stitution as poignantly as our local governments. Beseiged by popula-
tion implosion 6 and a plethora of unforeseen problems,7 local govern-
ments have found themselves crippled by the restrictive provisions of
the Constitution and by seemingly hostile courts." As a consequence,
perhaps few have more acutely felt the need for a new Constitution
than local governmental officials.
The purpose of this comment is to present an overview of the
dilemma of local governments, of possible approaches to metropolitan
and area-wide problems, recent constitutional attempts to free local
IM. W. Mumford & J. T. Otis, Prospectus for Change: A Proposed Local Govern-
ments Article for Illinois, 50-51 CHICAGO BAR RECORD 243, 244 (1970).
2I.e., " Ithe legislative assembly shall not pass local or special laws regulating county
and township affairs or creating offices or prescribing the powers or duties of offi-
cers in counties, cities or townships." MONT. CONST. art. V, § 26. The legislative
assembly may pass special laws providing any plan or form of municipal government
for counties, counties and cities, or cities and towns." MONT. CONST. art XVI, § 7.
"In addition, they may provide for the election or appointment of county, township,
precinct, and municipal officers as public convenience may require." MONT. CONST.
art. XVI, § 6. "And, in the case of municipal government for counties and cities
or cities and towns, may prescribe the number, designation, terms, qualifications,
method of appointment, election or removal of officers, and define their duties."
MONT. CONST. art. XVI, § 6. "The legislative assembly shall not delegate to any
special commission any power to perform any municipal functions whatever."
MONT. CONST. art. V, § 36.
This writer readily admits that illusions inhere in such an example as that created
above.
3MONT. CONST. art. XVI, § 4, which creates and provides for the board of county
commissioners, stands as a fairly classic example of constitutional hyper-detailism.
It contains roughly 2,500 words, 2,400 of which could have been left to the legislature.
'.e., MONT. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 5 and 6, with other revenue and indebtedness pro-
visions. See also MONT. CONST. art. XVI, § 4.
'See MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 4, MONT. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 4, 5, MONT. CONST.
art. XVI, §§ 4, 5.
"See generally, U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES, (1967), and REPORT TO THE LOCAL GOvERNMENT SUBCOMMITTEE TO THE
MONTANA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMITTEE, 4, 5, (1969).7Perhaps water and air pollution are the most patent examples, since they know no
jurisdictional boundaries and cannot be solved on a local level without a substantial
drain of already overburdened local revenues. Kennedy, "The Legal Aspects of Air
Pollution Control," MUNICIPALITIES AND THE LAW IN ACTION, 42 (1947).
"See generally, Macchiarola, Local Government Home Rule and the Judiciary, 48
JOURNAL OF URBAN LAW 335 (1971). See also cases, infra note 15.
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governments from traditional obstacles, and to offer a proposal for
consideration by Montana's Constitutional Convention.
THE FRAMEWORK
Two theories of state-local power distribution traditionally domin-
ate any discussion of local-governmental authority over local problems.'
The first is generally referred to as the "creature concept," and may be
capsulized in the statement that state supremacy will be considered
to exist absent specific constitutional provisions to the contrary. 10 This
plenary power of the state over municipal corporations" was described
by John F. Dillon, Iowa Supreme Court Justice:
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers
and rights wholly from, the Legislature. It breathes into them the
breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it
may destroy. If it may destroy, it may abridge and control."
In 1872 Justice Dillon articulated his and other judicial interpretations
of local governmental power into what has since been termed "Dillon's
Rule".' 3 It provides:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal
corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers, and no
others: first, those.granted in express words; second, those necessar-
ily or fairly implied or incident to the powers expressly granted; third,
those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and
purposes of the corporation,-not simply convenient, but indispens-
able. Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the exist-
ence of the power is resolved by the courts against the corporation
and the power is denied. (Emphasis in original)"
"Dillon's rule" received early approval by the Supreme Court of the
United StatesI5 and has since been accepted by virtually all state courts
as the proper statement of the natural state-local relationship.1 6
' INTERS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL ImITATIONS ON SOLUTIONs Or METROPOLITAN
AREA PROBLEMS, 3-7 (1961); see also 1 MCQUILLrN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 1.91
(3rd ed. 1949) and 2 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 10.01 et. seq. (3rd ed.
revised, 1966).
"Winters, supra note 9 at 8.
'A city is generally considered to be a public corporation existing within certain
boundaries, having a more or less urbanized population, and endowed with certain
governmental powers. 1 MCQUILLIN, supra note 9 at § 207. A county, on the other
hand, is often referred to as a quasi-municipal corporation which aids in the admin-
istration of governmental affairs and exercises the delegated sovereign powers of
the state. 1 McQUILLIN, supra note 9 at § 1.88.
"City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. River R.R. Co., 24 Iowa 455 (1868).
"ZSee LITTLEFIELD, METROPOLITAN AREA PROBLEMS AND MUNICIPAL HOME RULE, 7
(1962).
"DILLON, COMMENTARIES' ON THE LAW or MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 448-50 (5th ed.
1911).
'Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S. 540 (1875); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207
(1903); and particularly Worchester v. Worchester Consolidated Street Ry. Co., 196
U.S. 539, 548 (1905).
"
0 Local powers are limited to powers explicitly granted or indispensibly or impliedly
necessary. Mason City v. Zerble, 250 Iowa 102, 93 N.W.2d 94 (1958); Higgens v.
City of Galesburg, 401 Ill. 87, 81 N.E.2d 520 (1948). Grants of power are to be
construed against the city, Garden City v. Miller, 181 Kan. 360, 311 P.2d 306 (1957);
City of Chicago Heights v. Western Union, 406 Ill. 428, 94 N.E.2d 306 (1950), and
any reasonable doubt is to .be resolved against the city.
In Montana see Plath v. Hi-Ball Contractors, Inc:, 139.M. 263, 362 P.2d 1021 (1961);
1971]
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Somewhat antithetical to the creature-concept, the second theory
of state-local power distribution finds its more "American" roots in the
principle that local affairs can best be managed by local officials.17
The colonists of this country were perhaps unconscious proponents of
this theory, constantly manifesting a determination to enjoy self- gov-
ernment in internal affairs. 1 8 They had adopted the English local and
municipal systems, however, rather than creating them.' 9
As might be perceived through analysis of the "creature concept",
although local autonomy antedated the establishment of central or state
authority, the latter has clearly dominated the former, to the point
where the right to local self-government, if desired, needed to be stated
as an express limitation 20 upon the creature theory of centralized gov-
ernment. 21 Thus, while home rule exists today as both a political symbol
and as a legal doctrine, 22 and while it may seem only logical that mat-
ters of local concern should belong to local government, 23 when no con-
stitutional provision alters the state-local balance of power the munici-
pal corporation will be expected to operate within the restrictive frame-
work of "Dillon's Rule". 24
Montana may provide an excellent example of this abdication to the
creature concept. Although home rule provisions have been adopted
by over half the states25 and by at least eleven since 1950,26 it is prob-
able that Montana does not operate under the home-rule theory.27
While two leading authorities suggest that we may recognize the right
to local self-government, 28 we are generally omitted from compiled lists
of home rule jurisdictions. 29 Any extra constitutional right to local
Dietrich v. Deer Lodge, 124 M. 8, 218 P.2d 708 (1950); and Homes v. Polson, 123
Mont. 469, 215 P.2d 950 (1950).1
'COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 221-223 (6th ed.).
8C. ANDREWS, COLONIAL SELF-GOVERNMENT (The American Nation Series), 41, 42.
"McQuillin, supra note 9 at 325.
uThis is generally accomplished through the insertion of a "home rule" provision in
the state constitution.
Missouri was the first state to adopt a constitutional home rule provision in 1875.
Mo. CONST. art. IX, §§ 20-26. California followed suit in 1879. CAL. CONST. art. XI,§ 8.
"Winters, supra note 9 at 44.
'Ruud, Legislative Jurisdiction of Texas Home Rule Cities, 37 TEX. L. REv. 682 (1959).
11 MeQuillin, supra note 9.
"Winters, supra note 9 at 44.
1OWestbrook, Municipal Home Rule: An Evaluation of the Missouri Experience, 33
Mo. L. REv. 45 (1968).
"R.I. CONST. amend. XXVIII, § 2 (1951); LA. CONST. art. XIV, § 40 (1952); TEm.
CONST. art. XI, § 9 (1925); ALASKA CONST. art. VII, § 2 (1959); HAWAII CONST.
art. VII, § 2 (1959) ; KAN. CONST. art. XII, § 5 (1960) ; S.DAK. CONST. art. X, § 4, 5
(1963); CONN. CONST. art. II, § 6 (1965); MASS. CONST. art. II, § 6 (1966);
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 7 (1970); ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6 (1970).
!7MONT. CONST. art. V, § 26, which prohibits the legislature from enacting special laws
regulating county and township affairs, MONT. CONST. art. V, § 36, which prohibits
legislation delegating power to perform or interfere with municipal functions, and
MONT. CONST. art. XVI, § 7, which apparently grants the legislature plenary power
in dealing the form of local governments, are confusing in this respect.
zMcQuillin, supra note 9 at § 4.82; ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION LAW, § 2.05.
OSee, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 25.
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self-government in Montana, whether based upon an inherent right to
local self-government, or upon the distinction between the "govern-
mental" and "proprietary" functions of municipal corporations, would
appear to have been severly limited by those cases making specific
reference to the creature concept3" and those limiting the interpretation
given to "proprietary" functions.
3 1
Thus if home rule, or some hybrid between home rule and absolute
state domination, is indeed a key to stronger, more responsive local
government, the constitutional convention may provide the best, and
perhaps the only forum for the necessary reallocation of governmental
powers.
THE URBAN CONDITION
The problem-plethoric urban condition finds its genesis in popula-
tion growth and redistribution. 32 Between the years of 1860 and 1960
the population in the United States increased from 31.4 to 179.3 million,a3
and the enormous impact of this increase in population was felt in
urban, rather than rural areas. 4 The most recent trend has been an
exodus from the central city to the periphery and beyond, as manifested
by the encirclement of the city by sprawling suburbs 5 or by satellite
municipalities.3 6 The result of this migration has been the formation of
essentially local but legally extrajurisdictional suburban never-never
lands, or of unitary metropolitan areas which in fact are composed of
myriads of individual local governments.3 7 For instance, it was noted
by Illinois constitutional convention delegates that Illinois had more
governments per thousand (1/1,600) than dentists (1/1,800),38 that
"what the layman or sociologist would refer to as 'Chicago' comprises
over a thousand such units of government, including counties, cities,
towns, special service districts, school districts, unincorporated areas,
and parts of two states."39
While Montana may not exhibit a population comparable to that
of Illinois, we are nevertheless beset by many of the same problems.40
0State ex rel. Great Falls Housing Authority v. City of Great Falls, 110 Mont. 318,
100 P.2d 915 (1940).
'State ex rel. Helena Housing Authority v. City Council of Helena, 108 Mont. 347,
90 P.2d 514 (1939).
"Littlefield, supra note 13 at 2.
m1 U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, CENSUS OF POPULATION 1960 (1961) (table 2 at 1:4).
"Littlefield, supra note 13.
'Parkhurst, Article VII-Local Government, 52 CHICAGO B.J. 94, 95 (1970).
sLittlefield, supra note 13.
"Id. at 3.
6REPORT, POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL MODERNIZATION, COMMISSION
ON URBAN AREA GOVERNMENT, 5 (1960).
"Littlefield, supra note 13 at 3.
10This writer suggests that it may be folly to ignore the urban ills endured by our
more populous sister states, simply because of disparity in population. Montana's
population is almost certainly going to increase, and our Constitution must be far-
sighted enough to anticipate and provide for a more populous urban state. In addi-
tion, most metropolitan area difficulties are common to even smaller local units,
and differ only in magnitude or degree from those of highly populated areas. This
is particularly true of fragmentation and overlap.
1971]
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By 1960 Montana was classified as an urban state with over half of its
population living in or around twenty-six municipal corporations. 41
As in other states, our major cities have experienced an exodus of
higher income groups to beyond their artificial boundaries,4 2 while
simultaneously suffering an influx of lower income groups into the
city-cores. The result is a concurrent difficulty in achieving coordina-
tion of financial resources and an increased cost to the city in such
areas as housing and welfare. 43 It culminates in a structure wherein
those areas experiencing the greatest need for revenue are also those
areas ranking lowest in taxable resources and bonding capabilities.44
Lack of coordination leads to such inequities as double taxation of
citizens by overlapping layers of government and 'freeloading' by
suburban (or rural) citizens out of reach of the core city tax
collector."
These phenomena, known respectively as "pancaking" and "spill-
over",46 often make it impossible to relate services and benefits to taxes.47
Perhaps more unfortunate, they work a deterrent on the under-revenued
local government with regard to embarking on projects affecting more
than itself.48 Since most state constitutions limit the taxing and debt in-
curring powers of the local government, while prohibiting the state
from taxing for or extending credit to the same,49 it becomes incumbent
on state legislatures to attack the problem through the creation of
special improvement districts.50 Montana, in this respect, offers no ex-
ception to the general rule. Our constitution limits both the taxing5' and
"REPORT OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUBCOMMITTEE TO THE MONTANA CONSTITUTION
REvISIoN COMMITE:, Nov. 1969 as amended Jan. 1970 [hereinafter cited Mont. Rep.
on Local Govt.].
"Under Article XVI, § 7 of the Montana Constitution the legislative assembly appears
to be able, ''by general or special law'' to fix or define the boundaries of municipal
* corporations to embrace unincorporated areas surrounding them, subject to a majority
vote of those affected by the change. The requirement that no annexation occur
without first obtaining the assent of a majority of electors in the contiguous area
to be annexed is the rule rather than the exception, e.g., see CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1(a).
While this procedure is undeniably democratic, it has low political feasibility. Con-
sequently, if such a provision is to be included in the local government article of
a new constitution, delegates would do well to examine alternatives, e.g., Iowa altered
their code to provide two means by which annexation could be consummated: the
first is by application of the inhabitants of the adjacent area; the second is through
action of the municipal corporation itself. Iowa Code §§ 362.20, 362.66 (1966).
"Harris, The Economic Aspects of the Metropolitan Begion, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 464,
468 (1957).
"Grant, Metropolitan Problems and Local Government Structure: An Examination of
Old and New Issues, 22 VANDERBILT L. REv. 757 (1969).
15Id. at 762.
4J. BOLLENS AND H. SCHMANDT, THE METROPOLIS, 367 (1965). These terms speak to
such core-city activities as mass-transit, traffic control, and pollution control, which
benefit the non-resident as well as the paying resident, and the necessity to create
special units of government, vested with taxing power, to provide essentially local
services.
"1B. FRIEDEN, METROPOLITAN AMERICA: CHALLENGE To FEDERALISM, Submitted to the
Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee of the House Comm. on Government Oper-
ations, 89th Cong., 2nd Session (1966).
"'Note, Metropolitan Government: Minnesota's Experiment With A Metropolitan
Council, 53 MINN. L. REv. 123 (1969).
"Winters, supra note 9 at 36.
'OId.
"MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 5.
[Vol. 33
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debt incurring powers52 of the local government while expressly pro-
hibiting the state from taxing for 53 or assuming the debt 54 of the local
unit. It has been held that a Montana city cannot be compelled to
extend a service beyond its boundaries to meet area-wide needs. 55 The
result, as elsewhere, has been the creation of special districts, and as of
1967, 209 such districts had been authorized by state law.56
While the special district has been successful in subverting fiscal
limitations imposed upon local governments, it has caused the substitu-
tion of other problems among which are the creation of overlapping,
highly fragmented governmental units and of a piecemeal approach to
comprehensive planning.57 Because of the resulting difficulty in discern-
ing with whom the responsibility for local action or inaction lies, a
diminution of popular control has been effected.58 And because dif-
ferent units of government supply similar services to different popu-
lations, there exists inequality in the level of services available to the
individual local units.59
Clearly, the limitations placed upon local governments60 by state
constitutions have gone far toward crippling any coherent efforts di-
rected at solving municipal and metropolitan area problems. The states,
although empowered to act under "Dillon's rule" and the creature
concept, have been slow to respond,51 and have generally failed to
provide authorization for even the mildest reforms directed at such an
effort. 62  Counties, originally established as decentralized agents of
state government, are presently not equipped to handle the problems
raised by the metropolitan areas within their boundaries.6 3  Change is
necessary. As to what type of change, it will behoove us to digress
slightly and examine those approaches being tested by local governments
today.6
"]MONT. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 5, 6.
5MoNT. CONST. art. XII, § 4.
'"MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 4.
"Crawford v. City of Billings, 130 Mont. 158, 297 P.2d 292 (1956).
"Mont. Rep. on Local Govt., supra note 41 at 6.
wComus, The Council of Governments Approach to Government Fragmentation, 22
VANDERBILT L. REV. 811 (1968-69).
'Minn. Experiment, supra note 48 at 129.
"Grant, Trends In Urban Government and Administration, 30 LAw AN CONTEMP.
PRoB. 38, 46 (1960).
1°It should be noted that what may appear to be a limitation upon the state may work
an indirect limitation upon local government's ability to meet the challenges which
face it. The constitutional prohibition against special legislation may work such a
result. See MONT. CONST. art. V, § 26.1Bollens, supra note 46 at 529; Mont. Rep. on Local Govt., supra note 41 at 6.
6R. MARTIN, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 109 (1967). See CAMPBELL, THE
STATES AND THE URBAN CRISIS (1970) for a more comprehensive treatment of state
responsibility to the local government.
aRep. on Committee on Inter-Municipal Cooperation, 28 MuN. L. REv. 164, 174-5
(1965); WOOD, THE NEW METROPOLIS, DEMOCRACY IN URBAN AMERICA (1961).
"The purpose of this digression is not to single out approaches which might be in-
corporated into a new constitution. Such a maneuver would serve to freeze local
government into an inflexible stature, to lay the seeds for future problems. Rather
this writer would employ this device as an aid in understanding the problems of local
governments, and to point out what should not be precluded by a new article on local
government.
1971]
6
Montana Law Review, Vol. 33 [1972], Iss. 1, Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol33/iss1/8
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
PRESENT APPROACHES TO THE METROPOLITAN PROBLEM
As briefly outlined above, local governments are presently beset
by extremely difficult and multifarious problems. The key problem
is one of jurisdiction. Local governments are hamstrung, both by their
inability to act without prior legislative authorization, and by the fact
that demands for services often refuse to respect artificial political
boundary lines.6 5 This latter problem-that of confronting the local,
yet area-wide problem, of coordinating area resources to meet area
needs, of eliminating duplicity of effort through integration of govern-
mental units-has been the motivating force behind recent attempts
of local governments to mold themselves into more functional units.
66
ANNEXATION
Annexation is the absorbtion of territory by a municipality.
6 T
Theoretically, it is difficult to perceive of a more obvious means for the
municipal corporation to solve the problem which physically transcends
its boundaries than by extending that boundary to encompass the area
in question. It would certainly permit the recapture and reincorpora-
tion of revenues escaping to suburban areas.68
As a practical matter, however, annexation has not been a panacea.
The procedure is viewed as a purely political matter and consequently
one over which the state exercises plenary power.6 9 Seven methods
of annexation predominate those prescribed by the several states: 1)
legislative action; 2) popular vote of the annexing city; 3) popular
vote of the annexed area; 4) popular vote of both; 5) unilateral action
of the municipality; 6) judicial fiat upon petition; 7) determination by
a board or commission.70
As a political device for solving area-wide problems, annexation
has two serious drawbacks. The first is that the territory to be annexed
must be unincorporated.7 ' Thus the more prosperous suburban area may
avoid the burden of financial coordination with the city by simply in-
corporating itself. Second, since compulsory incorporation of govern-
mental areas is not favored in this country, a majority vote of the
electorate within the territory to be annexed is generally required.7
2
This latter requirement has severely limited the political feasibility of
annexation.73
"Comus, supra note 57 at 812.
'See generally, UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS [hereinafter cited as A.C.I.R.] ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES; COMM. FOR ECON.
DEV., MODERNIZING LOCAL GovT. 12 (1966).
'For a thorough discussion of annexation see 2 McQUMLIN, supra note 9 at § 7.01
et seq.
'See notes 43 through 45, supra, and accompanying textual discussion.
'2 McQuillin, supra note 9 at § 7.10.
11A.C.I.R., Alternative Approaches, supra note 6R Mt. 59
7'Comus, supra note 57 at 822.
"Id.
"See material, infra note 87.
[Vol. 33
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CONSOLIDATION
Consolidation, like annexation, is aimed at enlarging the physical
area over which the local government may exercise its jurisdiction. Un-
like annexation, which involves the incorporation of additional territory
under the same government, consolidation entails the incorporation of
two or more incorporated bodies into a single new governmental unit.
7 4
Consolidation provides several advantages as a problem alleviating
device for local governments. Since it may occur between contiguous
municipalities, or between a municipality and the county embracing it,
consolidation offers an area-wide approach to metropolitan problems.7 5
It possesses the virtue of enlarging territorial jurisdiction while reduc-
ing governmental duplication, overlap, and fragmentation.7 6 Unfortun-
ately, as the number of individual units which must be consolidated
increases, the feasibility of consolidation decreases.7 7 This, and our
nemisis, voter approval,78 have rendered consolidation less than perfect.
EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS
In certain instances the legislature has empowered the local gov-
ernmental unit to act on a specific problem beyond its boundaries.79
Although this device has limited usefulness as a comprehensive cure of
metropolitan ills, it has nevertheless been successfully employed in
certain areas, i.e., zoning.80
INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENTS AND TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS
Both the formation of intergovernmental agreements and the trans-
fer of functions between governmental units attack the problem of
duplication and deter the creation of special districts."'
Intergovernmental agreements take the form of contracts between
municipalities, or between municipalities and the county, for the per-
formance of services.8 2 These agreements, while generally requiring
712 MeQuillin, supra note 9 at § 8.23.
"F. SENGSTOCK, CONSOLIDATION: BUILDING A BRIDGE BETWEEN CITY AND SUBURB (1964).
'Grant, A Comparison Of Predictions And Experience With The Nashville "Metro",
1 URBAN AFFAIRS Q., 34-54 (1965); see also D. BooTH, METROPOLITICS: THE NASH-
VILLE COUNCIL (1963); R. MARTIN, CONSOLIDATION: JACKSONVILLE AND DuvAL
COUNTY (1968).
77Comus, supra note 57 at 822,23.
"The requirement of voter approval often proves fatal to governmental reorganiza-
tion on a local level. See A.C.I.R., FACTORS AFFECTING VOTER REACTION TO GOVT'L
REORGANIZATION IN METRO AREAS (1963).
19A.C.I.R., Alternative Approaches, supra note 66 at 20.
8For more complete treatment of this subject see SENGSTOCK, EXTRATERRITORIAL
POWERS IN THE METROPOLITAN AREA (1962); R. MADDOX, EXTRATERRITORIAL POWERS
OF MUNICIPALITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1955).
81Comus, supra note 57 at 819.
8The classic example appears to be Lakewood, California, which contracted virtually
all of its governmental services from the city of Los Angeles. S. GovE, THE LAKE-
WOOD PLAN (1961); Will, Another Look at Lakewood, READINGS IN STATE AND LOCAL
GOVFRxNMENT 328 (1964).
1971]
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statutory authorization, do not require voter approval and therefore
exhibit high political feasibility.8 3 By their nature, however, these agree-
ments are restricted to just certain local units or to certain unfurnished
services. Consequently, the intergovernmental agreement may have a
somnambulistic result, causing procrastination of comprehensive regional
planning, and exhibiting a prophylactic effect on necessary change.
SPECIAL DISTRICTS
The special district contemplates a form of government which
is independent of other governments. It is granted power to initiate
and complete projects, to provide services, is usually financed by
service charges and behaves as much like an independent government
as is necessary to accomplish its purposes.8 4
The propensity of state legislative assemblies to subvert the con-
stitutional limitations placed upon local governments by creating special
districts was touched upon earlier.8 5 While the necessity of this device
as a stop-gap measure cannot be questioned, the special district has
serious drawbacks. It constitutes another hidden layer of government,
increasing the fragmentation of the local unit,8 6 and causing further
diminution of popular control. It atomizes local government and thereby
renders planning difficult.8 T Finally, while its proponents argue that
the special district removes a local service from politics, it actually tends
to replace the general politics of the city with the more narrow, less
public politics of the special interest clientele.88
FEDERATION
The federation approach to local government generally involves
the creation of two levels, or tiers of government. One tier has area-wide
jurisdiction, and devotes itself to providing area-wide services. The
other tier is composed of the individual constituent municipalities and
devotes itself to the performance of local functions.8 9
As a device for accomplishing area-wide or metropolitan govern-
ment without requiring the composite units to relinquish control over
purely local matters, the federated form of government stands alone.90
1*Comus, supra note 57 at 818, 819.
mSee supra, notes 50-60 and accompanying textual discussion.
8BOLLENS, THE PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENT IN THE SAN FRANCISCO BAY REGION 27
(1948).6
aBOLLENS, SPECIAL DISTRICT GOVERNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES (1957).8A.C.I.R., THE PROBLEM OF SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1964).
11R. Martin, supra note 62 at 179.
11H. KAPLAN, URBAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (1967); GRUMM, METRO-AREA GOVERNMENT:
THE TORONTO EXPERIENCE (1959).
9The classic example of metropolitan federation is Toronto, created under The Munici-
pality of Metropolitan Toronto Act (1953), R.S. Ont. 260 (1960). There, thirteen (13)
local units were united for purposes of dealing with area-wide problems under a
representative Metropolitan council which was given the status of a municipal govern-
ment.
[Vol. 33
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It has shown itself to be politically feasible,91 yet strong enough to meet
complex metropolitan needs. 2 In addition, this devise is clearly amen-
able to such governmental innovations as preemption through action
and abdicating authority, thus prompting action as a response to growing
problems. In short, federation provides strength over area government
without stifling experimentation and creativity of approach by individ-
ual local governments.
THE METROPOLITAN COUNCIL
The Council of Governments (C.O.G.) offers a voluntary approach
to metropolitan problems.93 Whether prompted by fears of being ex-
cluded from regional planning or by other factors,9 4 the metropolitan
council has become an established means of effecting area-wide planning
and coordination.9" It is generally composed of appointed representa-
tives 6 from the participating local units97 and serves exclusively as a
recommending body to the legislature,9 as a forum for discussion of
metropolitan problems,9 9 as a planning agency,100 and as a research
uThis is largely because the individual municipal units remain intact, retaining juris-
diction over problems which affect only their affairs, and also have representation
in the metropolitan council.
wSee, Rose, A Decade of Metropolitan Government In Toronto, 13 BUFrALo L. REV.
539 (1964).
93This is not to say that the council of government cannot, in fact, be given a legal
status. See, e.g., Calif. Govt. Code §§ 6500-6513 as amended (1963).
"The availability of federal funds is probably an important incentive behind most
C.O.G.'s, since eligibility to the locality of these funds depends upon such factors
as citizen participation and area-wide planning. See, e.g., The Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1965, 40 U.S.C. § 461(g) (Supp. 1967) and The Demonstration
Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301 through 3374
(Supp. 1967).
Questionnaires involving the East-West Gateway Coordinating Council of St. Louis
indicated that 24% of the individual units had joined the council to remain eligible
for federal funds. See Hoadley, Metropolitan Council; The St. Louis Experience, 60
NAT. Civ. REV., 79 (Feb. 71).
9'Minnesota Experiment, supra note 48 at 140.
"It has been suggested that the council might better be "constitutionalized" through
elections, thus giving the citizen a direct voter relation to council officials. Dixon,
New Constitutional Forms for the Metropolis: Reapportioned County Boards; Local
Councils of Government, 30 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 57,64 (1965). This suggestion
is countered by the argument that qualified individuals are more apt to accept ap-
pointment than to seek election, that ballots are already overburdened, and that the
recommendational nature of these bodies leaves voter recourse at the legislative level,
where final decisions will be made. Minn. Experiment, supra note 48 at 147, 148.
7A potential flaw in the C.O.G. approach appears here. Since participation is generally
voluntary, it is possible that regional planning might be thwarted by the nonparticipa-
tion of sporadic units within the area.
"The Minnesota Council of Governments is of this type. See, Minn. Experiment, supra
note 48.
MThis is accomplished through regular meetings and sponsored seminars. If nothing else
could be said, the councils have been effective in reducing interlocal suspicions and
hostilities. STATEMENT OF METROPOLITAN ATLANTA COUNCIL OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS,
ANNUAL REPORT (Nov. 1967); R. HANSON, METROPOLITAN COUNCILS OF GOVERNMENTS,
14 (1966).
10See, e.g., discussion of eligibility for federal funds, supra note 94.
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center for the preparation of special studies. 10 ' The C.O.G. is generally
not considered as threatening to local governments, and does not inter-
fere in local politics. 0 2 It is consequently a politically feasible unit,
despite having indirect enforcement powers over participating munici-
palities.1 3 In short, while the metropolitan council may constitute
another "hidden layer of government,"'01 4 it has realized noteworthy
success as an approach to area-wide planning.
THE PLANNING AGENCY
The state or regional metropolitan planning agency generally con-
templates a more permanent body, administrated by public officials and
staffed by professionals. 00 Such an agency would clearly be useful in
guiding the metropolitan development of local governments, and could
also serve as an active conduit through which federal funds might be
obtained.'06 In addition, the agency approach, like the federation ap-
proach, offers a sound mechanism for administering a system of local
abdication of authority, should such a system be desired.
10 7
The goals sought through the employment of these devices'08 are
important in understanding the weaknesses built into present local
governmental structure. While it is true that many of these approaches
were required to meet the problems of natural growth, many were made
necessary by, and were adopted for the purpose of evading those con-
stitutional provisions which have straight-jacketed the local govern-
mental unit.
mThe Council of Governments has been highly effective in this area. In Minnesota, the
metropolitan council has completed studies on subdivision control, land use, water use,
financial coordination, population, street and highway standards, shopping centers,
and the availability of parks and other recreational facilities. Minn. Experiment,
supra note 48 at 144. In St. Louis an air pollution study resulted in the drafting of
a model air pollution control ordinance for the area. Comus, supra note 57 at 825.102Hoadley, supra note 94 at 81.
10As noted, 42 U.S.C. § 1335 (Supp. II 1967) gives the council a power of recom-
mendation over all local applications for federal aid in areas of metropolitan concern.
This, in and of itself, is a powerful persuasional tool.
'O'Bouens, supra note 86 at 1.
1
"See Note, The Regional Approach to Planning, 50 Iowa L. REv. 582, 593 (1965);
Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1957).
'wYeager, City and Town Boundaries-Incorporation, Consolidation, Annexation and
Severance Under Iowa Statutes, 19 DRAKE L. REV. 30 (1969).
InOregon has incorporated this system into their zoning law. Ore. Laws 324.1 (1969)
provides that the failure of city and county governments to prepare comprehensive
land use and zoning plans within two years thereafter would result in abdication of
their authority over such plans. Such power would then vest in the governor.
110These goals are listed in A.C.I.R., Alternative Approaches, supra note 66 at 11-17, as
follows:
1) The jurisdiction of the local government must be broad enough to cope adequately
with metropolitan problems.
2) The base of government must be broad enough to ensure that adequate revenues
can be obtained by equitable means.
3) There must be flexibility to alter boundaries to adjust to future growth.
4) Local government should be general purpose rather than single purpose to ensure
efficiency and a balance between needs and resources.
5) The local jurisdiction should be large enough so that the demand for services is
not out of proportion to the size of the governmental unit.
6) The government should be accessible to and controllable by the people.
7) The local government should be such as to foster active citizen participation.
8) The local government should be politically feasible.
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The point which emerges from the present situation is this: Stop-
gap measures have succeeded somewhat in alleviating local difficulties,
but they are nonetheless stop-gap measures. What is needed is a new
constitutional foundation from which the local government may pro-
ceed.10 9
DRAFTING THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROVISION
A new constitutional article on local government must accomplish
two basic changes. First, it must encourage greater flexibility over
area-wide, or metropolitan problems by insuring that all creative inter-
governmental approaches to such problems shall be available to the
various political subdivisions of the state. Second, it must work a
change on the creature concept by reallocating power between the state
and the local governmental units. These changes will permit power to
unite over area problems and to act upon local problems. In short, they
will permit efficiency and responsibility in local government.
ENCOURAGING INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGREEMENT
As noted earlier, there exist diversified approaches to the metro-
politan problem. 1 0 Consequently, any constitutional provision should be
drafted such that no workable approach is precluded, and moreover,
should encourage intergovernmental and regional cooperation."'
This can be accomplished by several constitutional methods. Alaska's
constitution,1 2 for example, contains sections of "purpose and construc-
tion" which preface each article. Such a section, while expressing the
general intent of the framers, constitutes a possible repository for the
encouragement of intergovernmental cooperation."'1
Alaska's constitution also contains a provision which specifically
grants local governments the power to transfer functions between units
and to consummate intergovernmental agreements."14 Similar provisions
have been incorporated into the Illinois constitution, 1 5 and, to a limited
degree, into the California constitution." 6
1m See Mont. Rep. on Local Govt., supra note 41 at 6.
"'See notes 65-107, supra, and the accompanying textual discussion.
'"This is not to urge that all regional devises are in fact sound; i.e., it has been sug-
gested that even fragmentation is preferable to complete consolidation of local units.
BANFIELD AND GRODZINS, LIMITATIONS OF METROPOLITAN REORGANIZATION, DEWOCRACY
IN URBAN AMERICA, 176 (1961). It is simply to suggest that the Constitution is no
place for such value judgments.
U2 See Appendix B, infra, for full text of Alaskan Local Government Provision.
"1ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 1, in fact does provide encouragement to local governments
to cooperate over area-wide problems, and also admonishes against such approaches
as the special district, which has caused as many problems as it has solved. It
states: "The purpose of this article is to provide for maximum self-government with
a minimum of local governmental units, and to prevent duplication of tax levying
jurisdictions. A liberal construction shall be given to the powers of local government
units. " I
u
4ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 13.
"'ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
n'CAL. CONST. art. II, § 6 and § 8.
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Such a provision is probably advisable, particularly in light of the
disinclination of state legislatures to authorize equivalent powers to
local units, and of courts to strictly construe their powers. 117 As noted
earlier, however, a provision of this type must be drafted as a broad
grant or certain innovative approaches to the metropolitan problem
may be precluded. Legislative supremacy may still be maintained, as it
was in both Alaska and Illinois, through the simple insertion of an
"unless prohibited by law or charter" clause within the provision.
The final method of encouraging cooperation between local govern-
ments is perhaps the most tempting and the least desirable. 118 It is the
adoption of provisions which authorize a particular approach to area-
wide problems. Thus the Illinois Constitution provides for a county
executive officer, 1 9 and the Alaska constitution creates a local affairs
agency.120 While both approaches are attractive, their inclusion into
the constitution has a freezing effect on future flexibility and tends to
deter alternative devices which may be equally, if not more, effective.' 2 '
Thus the adoption of particular methods of metropolitan problem fight-
ing should be left to the legislature, or to the local communities them-
selves.122
REALLOCATING POWER-THE HOME RULE GRANT
It is not difficult to perceive why "well-nigh unanimous cries for
home rule"'1 23 have been raised by political scientists and governmental
officials. Under the present domination of the "creature concept" it
has been necessary for the local unit to seek legislative authorization
for even the mildest exercise of governmental power.1 24 Consequently,
unduly large amounts of legislative time have been devoted to requests
for legislation directed towards the special problems of special cities.
2 5
The constant need for the local governments to seek authority has severe-
ly limited local bargaining power in that forum, and legislative systems
of political barter have required the compromise of city needs. 26 Not
only is the legislature less likely than municipal officials to be familiar
with the ramifications of urban problems, but responsibility to the local
electorates is often lost in the shuffle. 27 Since the situation is the same
uMont. Rep. on Local Govt., supra note 41 at 8.
uFELLMAN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION (1960).
nOILL. CONST. art. VII, § 4.
'"ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 14.
-"'When legislation is permitted to infiltrate a constitution, it shackles the hands
of the men and women elected by the people to exercise public authority." 1 J. BRYCE,
THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH, 444 (1913).
"'The greatest contribution which the revised Constitution could make in this regard
would be to refrain from limiting legislative solutions." Mumford & Otis, supra
note 1 at 247.
"J. C. Parkhurst, supra note 35 at 94.
"2J. E. Westbrook, supra note 25 at 47.
1OId. at 72, 73.
'DId.
'
2 7Sandalow, Limits of Municipal Power Under Home Rule: A Role For The Courts,
48 MINN. L. REv. 643, 655 (1964).
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in Montana 12 the question is not whether a home rule grant is necessary,
but how it should be drafted.
The predominant criticisms of home rule are amenable to elimination
through the proper construction of the home rule provision. The fear
that ultimate state control over local units might be lost, for instance,
has been reckoned with in nearly all recent constitutions. Hawaii leaves
it to the legislature to prescribe the limits of local self-government. 2 9
Alaska grants boroughs and cities all powers "not prohibited by law or
charter,"'13 0 and thereby insures legislative supremacy. South Dakota's
constitution combines these measures. 13i Illinois, in a more detailed ap-
proach, spells out the relationship between the local and central gov-
ernments' 32 and requires a 3/5 vote by the state legislature if any local
power is to be denied. 33 Through these means the local unit can be
granted broad powers of self-government without the feared loss of
state supremacy.
Likewise, the criticism that home rule retards the ability of govern-
ments to act over area-wide problems 34 may be substantially alleviated
through proper drafting. The provision discussed in the previous section,
on intergovernmental agreements and local flexibility, will do much in
this regard. The ideal approach, in addition, would be to make home
rule available to all political subdivisions. Alaska's constitution provides
that boroughs and cities of the first class may adopt a home rule char-
ter' 35 and that the legislature may extend home rule to other boroughs
and cities. 36 Illinois' constitution simply grants the home rule classifica-
tion outright to counties of more than 25,000, provided they elect an
executive officer. 3 7 These provisions are directed toward the area-wide
problem, but greater strength can be obtained through an open-ended
home rule section which speaks to political subdivisions generally. 138
In the realm of the domain and extent of the power granted, the
traditional home rule approach spoke to matters of local or statewide
concern.39 This distinction, while logically sound, raises pragmatic
difficulties, particularly when one recalls that urban and rural interests
both complement and rely upon each other. Innumerable grey areas are
MSee, e.g., Mont. Rep. on Local Govt., supra note 41 at 5; H.R. 2, 42nd Legis. Assem-
bly (1970).
'HAWAII CONST. art. VII, §§ 2, 3.
m3ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 11.
mS.D. CONST. art. X, §§ 4, 5.
'MFor the full text of this provision, see Appendix D, infra.
MILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(g) as limited by § 6 (1).1
"J. M. Winters, supra note 9 at 16.
=ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 9.
MALASKA CONST. art. X, § 10.
MILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(a).
mMumford and Otis, supra note 1 at 248. The local government provision suggested
by these scholars omitted all reference to '' counties'' and '' municipal corporations''
and instead spoke of '' political subdivisions " I and "governmental units. " I
mThis distinction was suggested by the National Municipal League in their Model
Constitution, NAT. MuNIciPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION, 97 (6th ed., 1963).
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inevitable. 140 The result is an uncertainty in the law which impedes local
officials and which renders the public uncertain as to who is account-
able.141
The preferable approach does not attempt to carve areas of local
autonomy, but rather reverses the old strict-constructionist presumption
against the existence of the municipal power. As noted, state supremacy
may still be maintained, but unless the legislature has denied the power,
local exercises thereof are presumed to be proper. This approach has
been adopted by the American Municipal Association, the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, and now by the National
Municipal League. 142 It has been embodied in the constitutions of
Alaska,'143 South Dakota,'4 4 and Massachusetts. 45 While Illinois opted
for a more detailed allocation of power between the state and local
governments,' 48 this writer suggests the avoidance of all detail that is
not absolutely necessary to the provision. Alaska's provision, when read
with their section on purpose and construction, is both simpler and more
organic.
SIMPLICITY
"The most obvious, and in many ways the crucial fault of state con-
stitutions is that they are too detailed.' 47 Local government is a subject
which state constitutions have traditionally devoted to excessive "detail-
ization", whether because of special interest groups wanting their par-
ticular views nailed down, or because of unfounded fears that future
legislators will not possess the wisdom of constitutional convention
delegates. 14 The wordy constitution leads to inflexibility, the need for
amendment, and constitutes an invitation to future litigation. 49 The
very fact that a new constitution is deemed more desirable than amend-
ment attests to this fact.15 0
The new constitutional provision on local government, if it is to be
more successful than the present provision, should be short, and couched
"ON. Littlefield, supra note 13 at 4. See also, Fortham, Home Bule-AMA Model, 44
NAT. Mum. REv. 137, 139 (1955).
laSawyer, The California City Versus Preemption by Implication, 17 HASTINGS L. J.
603 (1966).
142J. E. Westbrook, supra note 25 at 74.
148ALASKA CONST. art. X, § 11.
'"S.D. CONST. art. X, §§ 4 and 5.
"
5MASS. CONST. art. II, § 6 (amended 1966).
14 ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 10.
147D. Fellman, supra note 118 at 142.
1 8E.g., the Louisiana Constitution, in Article XIV, §§ 20-31.1, devoted 28 pages to the
government of New Orleans. The old California Constitution, in Article XI devoted
one-sixth of their constitutional verbosity to details of city and county government.
In their new Constitutional provision, Article II, local government is still subjected
to excessive detail.1
'D. Fellman, supra note 118 at 145.
2DeGrazia, State Constitutions-Are They Growing Longer?, 27 STATE GOVT. 82-83(1954).
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in simple, organic language.' 5 Detailed provisions on the structure and
procedure of the local governmental units should be left to the legisla-
ture or to the local units themselves. 152 Reference to specific types of,
local units, a device which tends to freeze those units into existence,
should be avoided. 53 Limitations upon taxation and indebtedness should
be left to the legislature. In short:
A constitution, to contain accurate detail of all subdivisions of which
its great powers will admit, and of all means by which they may
be carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal
code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would
probably never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore,
requires that only its great outlines should be marked, its important
objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those
objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.'
CONCLUSION
In light of the purpose of this comment, this writer has prepared
what he considers a sound provision on local government. 55
Section 1 is simply a restatement of Alaska's section on purpose and
construction, and will serve to offer our courts insight into the tenor
of the entire provision. Section 2 lays groundwork for the remainder
of the provision by establishing, without traditional restrictiveness, the
local units of government. It is open-ended as to types of local units,
yet adopts the Hawaii approach of vesting any such unit with govern-
mental power. Section 3 requires that the legislature classify political
subdivisions, but leaves the assembly free to chose the means of classifi-
cation, and to change that classification as may be required from time
to time. Taken with Section 4, which grants home rule outright to
political subdivisions of the first class, and Section 5, which permits
the legislature to grant home rule to governmental units not of the
first class, a healthy balance is created. The legislative assembly is given
both power and room for initiative. The local subdivisions, through
Section 6, are given broad home rule powers subject only to a power of
prohibition in the legislature.
Section 7 of the provision would accomplish the goal of providing
local flexibility over area-wide problems. It is broader than the simple
cooperation provisions in the Illinois and Alaska constitutions, in that
it permits changes in the form of governments over local units. Thus
the ambit of solutions, from cooperation to federation, remain available.
The reference to a state local affairs agency is probably unnecessary,
but is couched in permissive terms and is therefore innocuous if not
desired.
15 This writer's unavoidable infatuation with the Alaska Constitution is based on both
of these factors, particularly on the uncomplicated language employed therein.
u2Mont. Rep. on Local Govt., supra note 41 at 6.
13Mumford and Otis, supra note 1 at 247, 248. As noted, the terms "political sub-
division" or "governmental unit" provide greater flexibility.
'"Chief Justice John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 407 (1819).
"'See Appendix A, infra.
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Section 8 transfers the local tax and indebtedness provisions to
the local government article, incorporates them into a single section,
removes the rigid, constitutional limitations, and grants the power to
set such limitations in the legislative assembly.
Finally, Section 9 removes the absolute prohibition against special
or local legislation, but safeguards against abuses by requiring voter
approval in the area affected.
Admittedly, this provision is progressive. The need for change,
however, is clear. 158 The need for courage is clear. This provision is a
problem oriented approach to the urban ills which the present constitu-
tion has unwittingly helped to create. While a provision such as this will
not effect an immediate cure to all local conditions, it removes the
plethoric restrictions imposed upon both state and local governments,
and thereby increases flexibility and popular control.
A society in constant change demands governments responsive to
change. 157 Consequently, this provision seeks not to solve todays prob-
lems, but to enhance our ability to respond to the problems of tomorrow.
'Mont. Rep. on Local Govt., supra note 41 at 1.
mId. at 8.
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APPENDIX A
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT-
A PROPOSAL
ARTICLE: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Section 1: Purpose and Construction. The purpose of this article is to provide
for maximum local self-government with a minimum of local government units, and to
prevent duplication of tax-levying jurisdictions. A liberal construction shall be given
to the powers of local government units.
Section 2: All local government powers shall be vested in the political subdivisions
of the state. These shall include, but shall not be limited to, cities and counties.
Each political subdivision shall have the power to frame and adopt a charter for its
own self-government within such limits and under such procedures as may be prescribed
by law.
Section 3: The legislative assembly shall classify the political subdivisions of
the state. Such political subdivisions shall have those powers and functions provided
by charter or law, allowing for maximum local participation and responsibility.
Section 4: The qualified voters in any political subdivision of the first class
may adopt, amend, or repeal a home rule charter in a manner provided by law.
Section 5: The legislative assembly may extend home rule to other political sub-
divisions.
Section 6: A home rule unit may exercise all legislative powers not prohibited by
law or charter.
Section 7: (A) Regardless of home rule classification, agreements, including
those for cooperation and joint administration, and for transfer of functions, between
local subdivisions, local subdivisions and the state, or local subdivisions and the
United States, may be consummated except where prohibited by law or charter.
(B) The State shall encourage intergovernmental cooperation, and shall provide for
methods by which its political subdivisions may annex, consolidate, or change their
form of government. A state agency on local affairs may be created by the legislative
assembly to coordinate, advise and assist the various political subdivisions.
Section 8: The political subdivisions of the state shall have the power to tax,
improve through special assessments, and to incur indebtedness, as provided by law.
Section 9: Special acts of the legislature shall not be effective upon any particu-
lar subdivision of the state unless approved by a majority of the qualified electorate
voting therein.
APPENDIX B
ALASKA CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE X-LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Section 1: Purpose and Construction. The purpose of this article is to provide for
maximum local self-government with a minimum of local government units, and to
prevent duplication of tax-levying jurisdictions. A liberal construction shall be given
to the powers of local government units.
Section 2: All local government powers shall be vested in boroughs and cities.
The State may delegate taxing powers to organized boroughs and cities only.
Section 3: The entire State shall be divided into boroughs, organized or un-
organized. They shall be established in a manner and according to standards provided
by law. The standards shall include population, geography, economy, transportation,
and other factors. Each borough shall embrace an area and population with common
interests to the maximum degree possible. The legislature shall classify boroughs
and prescribe their powers and functions. Methods by which boroughs may be organ-
ized, incorporated, merged, consolidated, reclassified, or dissolved shall be prescribed
by law.
Section 4: Assembly: The governing body of the organized borough shall be
the Assembly, and its composition shall be established by law or charter. Each city
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of the first class, and each city of any other class designated by law, shall be repre-
sented on the assembly by one or more members of its council. The other members
of the assembly shall be elected from and by the qualified voters resident outside
such cities.
Section 5: Service areas to provide special services within an organized borough
may be established, altered, or abolished by the assembly, subject to the provisions of
law or charter. A new service area shall not be established if, consistent with the
purposes of this article, the new service can be provided by an existing service area,
by incorporation as a city, or by annexation to a city. The assembly may authorize
the levying of taxes, charges, or assessments within a service area to finance the
special services.
Section 6: Unorganized Boroughs: The legislature shall provide for the per-
formance of services it deems necessary or advisable in unorganized boroughs,
allowing for maximum local participation and responsibility. It may exercise any
power or function in an organized borough which the assembly may exercise in an
organized borough.
Section 7: Cities. Cities shall be incorporated in a manner prescribed by law,
and shall be a part of the borough in which they are located. Cities shall have the
powers and functions conferred by law or charter. They may be merged, consolidated,
classified, reclassified, or dissolved in the manner provided by law.
Section 8: The governing body of a city shall be the council.
Section 9: Charters: The qualified voters of any borough of the first class or
city of the first class may adopt, amend or repeal a home rule charter in a manner
provided by law. In the absence of such legislation, the governing body of a borough
or city of the first class shall provide the procedure for the preparation and adoption
or rejection of the charter. All charters, or parts or amendments of charters, shall be
submitted to the qualified voters of the borough or city, and shall become effective
if approved by a majority of those who vote on the specific question.
Section 10: The legislature may extend home rule to other boroughs and cities.
Section 11: A home rule borough or city may exercise all legislative powers
not prohibited by law or charter.
Seciton 12: A local boundary commission or board shall be established by law
in the executive branch of the state government. The commission or board may con-
sider any proposed local government boundary change. It may present proposed
changes to the legislature during the first 10 days of any regular session. The
change shall become effective forty-five days after presentation or at the end of the
session, whichever is earlier, unless disapproved by a resolution concurred in by a
majority of the members of each house. The commission or board, subject to law,
may establish procedures whereby boundaries may be adjusted by local action.
Section 13: Agreements, including those for cooperative or joint administration
of any function or powers, may be made by any local government with any other
local government, with the State, or with the United States, unless otherwise provided
by law or charter. A city may transfer to the borough in which it is located any of its
powers or functions unless prohibited by law or charter, and may in like manner
revoke the transfer.
Section 14: An agency shall be established by law in the executive branch of
the state government to advise and assist local governments. It shall review their
activities, collect and publish local government information, and perform other duties
prescribed by law.
Section 15: Special service districts existing at the time a borough is organized
shall be integrated with the government of the borough as provided by law.
APPENDIX C
HAWAII CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE VIII-LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Section 1: The legislature shall create counties, and may create other political
subdivisions within the State, and provide for the government thereof. Each political
subdivision shall have and exercise such powers as shall be conferred under general
laws.
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Section 2: Each political subdivision shall have power to frame and adopt a
charter for its own self-government within such limits and under such procedures
as may be prescribed by law.
Section 3: The taxing power shall be reserved to the State except so much
thereof as may be delegated by the legislature to the political subdivisions, and the
legislature shall have the power to apportion state revenues among the political sub-
divisions.
Section 4: No law shall be passed mandating any political subdivision to pay any
previously accrued claim.
Section 5: This article shall not limit the power of the legislature to enact
laws of statewide concern.
APPENDIX D
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION
ARTICLE VII-LocAL GOVERNmENT
Section 6: Powers of Home Rule Units
(a) A County which has a chief executive officer elected by the electors of the
county and any municipality which has a population of more than 25,000 are home
rule units. Other municipalities may elect by referendum to become home rule units.
Except as limited by this Section, a home rule unit may exercise any power and
perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not
limited to, the power to regulate for the protection of the public health, safety,
morals and welfare; to license; to tax; and to incur debt.
(b) A home rule unit by referendum may elect not to be a home rule unit.
(c) If a home rule county ordinance conflicts with an ordinance of a municipality,
the municipal ordinance shall prevail within its jurisdiction.
(d) A home rule unit does not have the power (1) to incur debt payable from
ad valorem property tax receipts maturing more than 40 years from the time it is
incurred or (2) to define and provide for the punishment of a felony.
(e) A home rule unit shall have only the power that the General Assembly may
provide by law (1) to punish by imprisonment for more than six months or (2) to
license for revenue or impose taxes upon or measured by income or earnings or upon
occupations.
(f) A home rule unit shall have the power subject to approval by referendum
to adopt, alter or repeal a form of government provided by law, except that the form
of government of Cook County shall be subject to the provisions of Section 3 of this
Article. A home rule municipality shall have the power to provide for its officers,
their manner of selection and terms of office only as approved by referendum or as
otherwise authorized by law. A home rule county shall have the power to provide for
its officers, their manner of selection and trems of office in the manner set forth
in Section 4 of this Article.
(g) The General Assembly by a law approved by the vote of three-fifths of the
members elected to each house may deny or limit the power to tax and any other
power or function of a home rule unit not exercised or performed by the State other
than a power or function specified in subsection (1) of this section.
(h) The General Assembly may provide specifically by law for the exclusive
exercise by the State of any power or function of a home rule unit other than a
taxing power or a power or function specified in subsection (1) of this Section.
(i) Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the State any
power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law
does not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the Stateo's
exercise to be exclusive.
(j) The General Assembly may limit by law the amount of debt which home rule
counties may incur and may limit by law approved by three-fifths of the members
elected to each house the amount of debt, other than debt payable from ad valorem
property tax receipts, which home rule municipalities may incur.
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(k) The General Assembly may limit by law the amount and require referendum
approval of debt to be incurred by home rule municipalities, payable from ad valorem
property tax receipts, only in excess of the following percentages of the assessed
value of its taxable property: (1) if its population is 500,000 or more, an aggregate
of three percent; (2) if its population is more than 25,000 and less than 500,000, an
aggregate of one percent; and (3) if its population is 25,000 or less, an aggregate of
one-half percent. Indebtedness which is outstanding on the effective date of this
Constitution or which is thereafter approved by referendum or assumed from another
unit of local government shall not be included in the foregoing percentage amounts.
(1) The General Assembly may not deny or limit the power of home rule units
(1) to make local improvements by special assessment and to exercise this power
jointly with other counties and municipalities, and other classes of units of local
government having that power on the effective date of this Constitution unless that
power is subsequently denied by law to any such other units of local government or
(2) to levy or impose additional taxes upon areas within their boundaries in the
manner provided by law for the provision of special services to those areas and for
the payment of debt incurred in order to provide those special services.
(m) Powers and functions of home rule units shall be construed liberally.
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